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Aviation connects the global community and ismoving more people and payloads faster thanever. The next decade will experience an
increase in manned and unmanned aircraft and systems
with new features and unprecedented applications.
Cybertechnologies—including software, computer net-
works, and information technology—are critical and
fundamental to these advances in meeting the needs of
the aviation ecosystem of aircraft, pilots, personnel,
passengers, stakeholders, and society.
Air travelers already are using aviation cybertech-
nologies when booking tickets, checking in at the air-
line counter, going through airport security, and
connecting to aircraft cabin Wi-Fi and in-flight enter-
tainment. Many of the advances, however, are “under
the hood”—in the infrastructure of avionics, air traf-
fic control, airlines, and airports—on the ground, air-
borne, and in space. Cybertechnologies are embedded
in the time-critical fabric that controls and assures avi-
ation operations, safety, and performance. 
Despite the great gains achieved and anticipated,
cybertechnologies expose aviation to a dangerous and
costly world of threats. Aviation is no stranger to threats
and has matured to operate amid physical adversities
from nature and mankind. But one century of flight is
not sufficient to master completely the art of managing
the risks threatening safety and performance. 
Threats to cybersecurity pose a major challenge—
the unpredictability of an attack makes the risks dif-
ficult to understand. In addition, the opportunities for
attacks continually grow as new services and systems
are developed.
Aviation and Cybersecurity
Opportunities for Applied Research
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(Above:) Technology is
involved in almost every
step of air travel, from
check-in to baggage claim. 
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Emerging Cyberrisks 
In 1997, the aviation sector experienced one of the
earliest cyberattacks, when a teenager in Worcester,
Massachusetts, exploited a vulnerability in a local
airport’s telecommunications service infrastructure.
This denial-of-service attack exposed a weakness in
the system—the reliance on an infrastructure’s
unfailing availability.
Recent remote hacking incidents targeting air-
lines, airports, and air traffic control systems show
that cyberrisks will only grow; airport passport con-
trol, crews, airline passengers, and baggage control
systems are frequent targets. 
In 2013, more than 75 U.S. airports reported
phishing—e-mails that attempt to defraud users into
revealing financial information. The same year,
Miami International Airport experienced more than
20,000 hack attempts per day, and Los Angeles
World airports blocked almost 60,000 cases of Inter-
net misuse and 2.9 million hacking attempts. 
In addition, in 2014, a Tunisian hacker team tar-
geted U.S. airport computer and communications
systems. In the summer of 2015, LOT Polish Airlines
was forced to ground flights at Warsaw airport after
hackers disabled the flight plans for outbound air-
craft. 
Cyberadvances that have assisted in aviation
operations include commercial technologies, such
as Wi-Fi, GPS, Internet protocols, open-source oper-
ating systems, virtualization, and cloud computing.
These have made aviation systems cheaper, faster,
and interoperable worldwide. But these technologies
also have inherent vulnerabilities that can be tar-
geted remotely by cyberadversaries. 
Open-source, cheap, and powerful tools that can
exploit vulnerabilities make external cyberattacks
on aviation assets far less complicated. For example,
a White Sands Missile Range test exercise demon-
strated that the GPS signals used for navigating an
unmanned aircraft, or drone, can be accessed
remotely to divert the flight onto erroneous paths. 
Simulation studies at hacker conferences have reit-
erated the feasibility of attacking air traffic control sys-
tems with inexpensive equipment. A cyberattack
could show bogus aircraft on the screens of air traffic
controllers and pilots, influencing unsafe actions and
unwarranted performance losses. Moreover, the recent
Germanwings flight allegedly crashed by a suicidal
pilot suggests the potential for insider threats and the
need for improvements in managing the people
entrusted with legitimate access to the system. 
Visibility and scale make the aviation industry an
attractive target for malicious actions. A single, seem-
ingly isolated, disruption of aviation—caused, for
example, by a single computer failure, a weather-
affected sector, or a natural disaster near an airport—
can cascade quickly across the system and affect the
economies of a nation and of continents for days to
months. Millions of passengers can be stranded and
inconvenienced worldwide, an enormous financial
loss. Addressing aviation cybersecurity aggressively is
critical.
Aviation Cybersecurity
Although the aviation industry is not alone in fight-
ing cybersecurity threats, the challenges to trans-
portation systems—and specifically to aviation—are
unique. The aviation industry is working to under-
stand cybersecurity threats, risks, and management.  
For example, the Aviation Information Sharing
and Analysis Center1 (ISAC) and the second edition
of the Cyber Security Toolkit2 from the International
Aviation Transport Association provide guidance for
airlines and strategic partners about evolving regu-
lations, new attack vectors, and more. 
Other efforts include the Cybersecurity Special
Task Force of the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization and the proposed FAA CyberAIR Act,
intended to bridge the gaps in aviation cybersecurity.
The goals include identifying cybersecurity vulner-
An early cyberattack on
the aviation sector
occurred at Worcester
Regional Airport in 1997,
when a teenager
exploited vulnerability in
the telecommunications
service infrastructure. 
1 a-isac.com.
2 iata.org/publications/.
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abilities, assessing threats, and finding standard mit-
igations to manage the risks to the system. 
Systems and Adversaries
System at Risk
The aviation ecosystem is a complex system of sys-
tems—a large number of aircraft and their users are
connected to a global infrastructure composed of
many systems of competing airlines, national air traf-
fic control systems, competing airport systems, air-
craft stakeholder businesses, personnel, and
passengers. The ecosystem also includes the natural
environment within which aircraft operate. 
Safety, efficiency, capacity, security, and environ-
mental sustainability are key performance goals of
this system. Cyberthreats can degrade these perfor-
mance goals by compromising a combination of
information, network, Internet, and other elements
of the critical information infrastructure.
Who Is the Adversary?
An adversary can be classified according to motiva-
tion, resources, target, attack vectors, and other char-
acteristics. Adversaries by motivation and resources
commonly include amateurs, hacktivists, criminals,
insiders, spies, and terrorists. 
An adversary may directly target any system asset,
including ground-based systems, aircraft, or satel-
lites, via vulnerabilities in network connectivity, soft-
ware, hardware, and human-in-the-loop processes.
The adversary also can compromise the integrity,
authenticity, confidentiality, and availability of data.
Furthermore, an adversary may target a single com-
ponent—part of the air traffic control system; a per-
formance goal of the aviation ecosystem, such as
on-time flights or safety metrics; stakeholder busi-
nesses; or passengers. 
In general, cyberattacks fall into three categories: 
u Passive—the adversary simply listens and
observes;
u Active—the adversary transmits signals or data
and receives responses; and
u A passive–active combination. 
Passive listening can reveal sensitive information
or lay the groundwork for more active attacks. The
active transmission of incorrect data, however, can
prompt erroneous and inappropriate reactions from
the targeted system or systems and therefore can
pose the greatest threat.
Embedding Cybersecurity
The risks, the adversaries, and the pathways for
attacks are similar for a single corporate company or
for a large government agency. Attacks cause losses
within minutes and hours, but the discovery and
response can take days. 
Best practices have evolved to reduce this time
gap, but even with best practices, large institutions
can be breached. The adversary is global, persistent,
sufficiently funded and always learning. Defeating
the adversary may be difficult, but focusing on man-
agement and approaches that can hinder an attacker
long enough for a response could be feasible.
Cybersecurity is not yet as embedded as reliabil-
ity into the design life cycle of aviation systems. Typ-
ical aviation system concerns—such as safety, flight
performance, environmental impact, fuel efficiency,
and airspace security—are alien to the world of
A LOT Polish Airlines
Boeing 767. In 2015,
hackers disabled flight
plans for outbound LOT
aircraft. 
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FAA began using the
Automatic Dependent
Surveillance–Broadcast
system for air traffic
control in 2009. 
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cybersecurity. In designing a system to protect air-
craft data, do programmers consider how a pilot or
an aircraft mechanic would use the system? Is a
cybersecure system able to perform in an aircraft
emergency? 
Similarly, the concepts of cybersecurity may be
alien to aviation professionals. Pilots today often
carry an electronic tablet containing their flight kit
into the cockpit. What security precautions are
appropriate for connecting the tablet to the avionics
system? 
The trade-offs are complex when considering ease
of use, safety, performance, cost, and on-time depar-
tures with last-minute crew changes. Adding cyber-
security concerns to the design, deployment, and
upgrading of modern aviation systems will increase
the cost and complexity of slow processes already
heavily regulated. Cyberadversaries are not encum-
bered by these same rules and timescales.
Combatting Cyberrisks
Combating aviation cyberrisk requires segregating
the intended function of each system and analyzing
the criticality of a threat to each component. For
example, communicating air traffic control data to a
controller separating in-flight aircraft is an intended
function distinct from the collection of passenger
manifests and credit card information for ticket pay-
ments. But if all these data are uploaded to a cloud
platform, an attack on that data could create a time-
sensitive and life-threatening situation.
Proactively addressing security threats to the most
safety-critical systems requires the expertise of the
user community—air traffic controllers, mainte-
nance technicians, pilots, and security experts—to
identify and rate the potential risks and to focus the
mitigation options on the most critical issues. In
building systems that address security concerns, the
design must allow for security upgrades as part of the
natural life cycle; this requires a continuous review
of threats and a secure funding stream to implement
mitigating strategies. 
In the aviation environment, many resilient ele-
ments within systems decrease the likelihood of an
event. For example, a remote takeover of an air trans-
port aircraft would require intimate knowledge of
the systems and the ability to defeat checks built into
the onboard avionics. Nevertheless, radio frequency
(RF) links into the aircraft may provide a possible
point of entry for the introduction of malware
attacks. Many of these links—but not all—are con-
sidered strong and robust and may limit the oppor-
tunity to jam or spoof the signals without detection.  
Weak RF links in the system include the Global
Navigation Satellite System signal that provides crit-
ical navigation information to the pilot and transmits
data to air traffic controllers via an onboard Auto-
matic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B).
An independent validation process has been
designed to address some of the threats to these
data—secondary means are needed to validate the
aircraft’s location. 
This secondary validation gives the pilot or con-
troller the opportunity to confirm the integrity of the
aircraft’s position, inserting a pause into the decision
process and arming the operator with knowledge
about a possible exploit. Although this helps to miti-
gate the data security risk, the stress increases with the
involvement of weather or other factors—the crew
must decide which system to trust if the systems do
not agree. Not all pathways to mitigation are ideal.
RF links are only one of many systems that
require continued investigation of all the cybersecu-
rity implications. Security must be designed into the
system as part of the ongoing life cycle, allowing for
A technician rewires and
installs telecommunica-
tions equipment at the
Chicago En Route Center
in Aurora, Illinois. The
scale of interconnected
technology in aviation
makes the industry a
 target for hackers.
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appropriate responses to known risks and for the
flexibility to detect and prevent “unknown
unknowns” from crippling the aviation system. 
Standards and Best Practices
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently
issued a call for proposals on aircraft systems infor-
mation security and protection measures.3 The call
responded to a 2015 breach and a Government
Accountability Office report4 pointing to cybersecu-
rity concerns for increasingly electronically enabled
planes and airports—both indications of the need for
better cybersecurity standards and practices in the
industry.
A comprehensive framework for preventing
cybersecurity threats is in development, based on
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s
best practices for FAA’s next-generation aviation sys-
tem, NextGen. In addition to these steps, significant
new work and research are needed to design, test,
and deploy more cybersecure systems. In the United
States, the Radio Technical Commission for Aero-
nautics has published a document, Airworthiness
Security Methods and Considerations,5 offering guid-
ance on information security for continued airwor-
thiness; these concepts will have an impact on the
NextGen systems.
The Aviation Information Sharing and Analysis
Center serves as a clearinghouse for best practices
from industry and academia in addressing individ-
ual systems, as well as the encompassing environ-
ment. Airlines are racing to provide services to
passengers, flight support for crew, and more effi-
cient tools for diagnostics and maintenance. The
cybersecurity of these initiatives may not be keep-
ing pace with the rush to the competitive market-
place.
The new cybersecurity systems being deployed
not only must address current threats but must antic-
ipate the need to address current and possible future
threats that were not part of earlier designs. The avi-
ation systems in development for flight control, posi-
tion, and automatic pilot capabilities must include
integrity checks, authentication mechanisms, and
privacy-preserving capabilities. Any communication
system in the aviation industry must be considered
for its potential to be blocked, spoofed, intercepted,
and possibly altered in a way that may look correct
but is dangerously wrong.
The best practices to identify, protect, monitor,
mitigate, and update should become the framework
for each stage of new system designs and upgrades.
Research and Development
FAA’s recent call for proposals on cybersecurity mea-
sures is a step in the right direction for investigating
and recommending solutions to some of the known
weak links in proposed communication systems.
These include research into the impact of larger vol-
umes of UAS traffic and increased reliance on com-
puter-to-computer signaling for decisions from
aircraft spacing to weather avoidance. 
Other areas for investigation include privacy
issues involving access to the precise positioning and
identification of air traffic in real time. Satellite-based
systems can be exploited for communication chan-
nels, and positioning system signals can be delayed,
altered, or blocked.
Vulnerabilities are not in the avionics systems
only.  Crews, their authentication, security practices
for devices, route planning, and integration in the
cockpit present areas to address. The insider threat,
described in more detail in the article on page 44, can
never be solved via technology alone. 
Airports and airlines are an increasingly complex
system of industrial control systems, from lighting to
baggage handling to maintenance, in addition to pas-
senger manifests, cargo information, and flight plan-
ning. As society increasingly relies on electronic
devices, the security of the Airport of Things is ripe
for definition and understanding.  
In-flight Wi-Fi and other
passenger services also
are vulnerable to
cyberattack. 
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